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of the U.S. Constitution and (2) are valid under the originating treaty’s
procedural and substantive law. Post-treaty pronouncements that pass this
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps one of the most contentious issues of constitutional law is the
role of treaties.1 Treaties occupy a tenuous position both in the separation
of powers between the branches of the federal government and in the
balance between the national and state governments. Under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, “all Treaties made” are among the categories
declared “the supreme Law of the Land.”2 Article II furnishes the power to
enter into treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the

1

There is prolific literature on the subject. See, e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and
the Rule of Law: The Judicial Power to Compel Domestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REV. 344
(2010); Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 239 (2013); Vincent J. Samar, The Treaty Power and the Supremacy Clause: Rethinking Reid v.
Covert in a Global Context, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 287 (2010); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV.
599 (2008); Steven T. Voigt, The Divergence of Modern Jurisprudence from the Original Intent for
Federalist and Tenth Amendment Limitations on the Treaty Power, 12 U. N.H. L. REV. 85 (2014).
2
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Senate.3 Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I grants
Congress the power to enact laws in pursuance of those treaties.4
In the centuries since the Constitution’s ratification, the United States’
participation in multilateral treaties and agreements has skyrocketed.5 This
ever-growing trend—one that shows no signs of stopping—highlights the
importance of properly setting limits on Congress’s treaty-executing power.
Under a republican system, treaties are controversial because their writers
are not always persons accountable to the people of the United States.6
Indeed, treaties are often written in significant part by officials from other
countries.7 This lack of direct accountability should require more stringent
constitutional scrutiny on Congress’s attempts to apply treaties through
legislation.
As a starting point, however, it is essential to define what a treaty is
for the purposes of determining the content of the supreme law of the land.
Doing so in the contemporary international order is ambiguous in at least
two ways. First, treaties and agreements are not static creatures. Not only
may they be amended, but especially when they establish organizations to
enforce their provisions, they may also generate further pronouncements,
including international court decisions and international organization
legislation. While these pronouncements are not themselves the treaties,
they are made under the procedural and substantive guidelines thereof.
Examples include resolutions of the United Nations (U.N.),8 judgments of
3

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
4
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). It
is, of course, possible that an act of Congress executing a treaty provision may be directly authorized by
one of the other enumerated powers in Article I. However, the vast body of case law on treaty execution
deals with more complicated scenarios which cannot be shoehorned easily into one of those enumerated
powers.
5
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2013 (2013 & Supp.
2015), http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/ [https://perma.cc/B4HP-VZ4M].
6
E.g., Voigt, supra note 1, at 85–86.
7
In many instances, the United States is just one of many countries with a vested interest in the
scope of the treaty. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty involved balancing interests of
the United States, its allies in Western Europe, and other countries interested in nuclear weaponry.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161
[hereinafter NPT]. As Professor Mallard notes, the NPT is thus the product of intersecting, sometimes
conflicting, interests, with U.S. interests being only one source. See generally GRÉGOIRE MALLARD,
FALLOUT: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL FRACTURE (2014).
8
For example, the Security Council adopts resolutions regarding international peacekeeping and
security. E.g., S.C. Res. 2178, ¶¶ 11–13 (Sept. 24, 2014) (calling for international cooperation in
engaging and collecting data on terrorist groups); S.C. Res. 2141 (Mar. 5, 2014) (setting agenda and
schedules for expert investigations into North Korean nuclear proliferation). The General Assembly
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the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Board (DSB),9
and the triggering of Article 5 obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty.10 Such pronouncements by treaty organizations raise the question of
how to determine if and when these become part of the law of the land as
“treaties,” and whether an act of Congress in pursuance of such a
pronouncement is constitutional.11 Moreover, it is unclear what precedence
within the hierarchy of laws in the United States these pronouncements
should take. Should they be equivalent to the originating treaties or should
they take lower precedence? If they are given lower precedence, how much
lower than the original treaties should they be?
A second ambiguity emerges with the increasing proliferation of
voluntary, rather than mandatory, multilateral agreements among nations.
Whereas mandatory treaties lay out explicit requirements for signatories,
voluntary agreements set goals that are either aspirational, indefinite, or
both.12 One illustrative case is the Kyoto Protocol, which regulates
signatory nation-states’ carbon emissions through sliding-scale target
emissions levels and reductions.13 The United States signed but did not
ratify the Protocol, and thus the Protocol imposes no binding obligations on

adopts resolutions on a broader spectrum of issues. E.g., G.A. Res. 69/1 (Sept. 19, 2014) (supporting
establishment of a U.N. Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, and calling for members’ support);
G.A. Res. 68/242 (Dec. 27, 2013) (acknowledging rights advances in Myanmar, but calling for further
action from the junta government).
9
The United States has been involved in several trade disputes at the DSB as both complainant and
defendant. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2012) (finding U.S. subsidies
for Boeing’s aircraft production actionable for European country complainants); Appellate Body
Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, ¶¶ 62, 242, WTO Doc. WT/DS396/AB/R (Dec. 21,
2011) (agreeing with the United States’ contention that the Philippines’ excise tax on certain spirits
based on the raw materials used in their production discriminated against foreign spirits).
10
Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
founding document, any attack on a member state in Europe or North America is considered an attack
on all members, triggering a duty of collective defense. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, opened for
signature Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force Aug. 29, 1949). The first
time this Article was invoked occurred immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the
United States. NATO, NATO Topics – Collective Defence – Article 5, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Dec. 16,
2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm?# [https://perma.cc/F6TH-AVUQ].
11
One notable example, the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, Pub.
L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991) [hereinafter AUMF], initiated U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf
War. The AUMF based its authority in part on a United Nations Security Council Resolution
authorizing member states to use “all necessary means” to resolve the Iraq–Kuwait conflict then
ongoing. S.C. Res 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
12
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939, 966
(2008).
13
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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the United States.14 In a hypothetical world where the United States ratified
the Kyoto Protocol, the sliding-scale nature of the obligations it imposes on
members raises the question of the strength of carbon emissions laws
Congress could enact to reach such targets. Is a law “requiring” the meeting
of an “aspirational” or “voluntary” target under penalty a “necessary and
proper” exercise of Congress’s treaty-executing power? If a treaty target is
wholly voluntary by its own explicit terms, with no real penalties for
noncompliance, can Congress pass a strict law with severe criminal or civil
penalties to meet that target? The questions of how to interpret the
enforceable extent of the targets in voluntary agreements, and whether the
targets can be turned into mandatory rather than aspirational, amorphous
laws, are thus very real concerns in determining the limits of congressional
power.15
This Note argues that the two ambiguities pose different, complex
problems, and therefore require different, complex solutions. For both
voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements, this Note begins with
the assumption that a given treaty was ratified within constitutional
bounds.16 For voluntary treaties, the main constitutional concern is whether
a proposed implementing statute is reasonable in light of the United States’
commitment to and involvement in the treaty. Voluntary treaties must be
executed by statute in light of the vague delineations of the United States’
obligations in the treaty itself—and should thus not be treated as selfexecuting17—but this does not grant Congress unlimited license to
“execute” such a treaty. A statute enforcing a voluntary treaty (1) must be a
reasonable interpretation of the language and goals of the treaty and (2)
must enforce the voluntary target to an extent that is reasonable given two
factors: (a) the level of commitment the United States has most recently
expressed (prior to the statute’s enactment) and (b) the United States’
ability and willingness to comply with voluntary targets.
For post-treaty pronouncements, the main concerns are the propriety
of the pronouncement in light of the treaty from which it was generated,
and the overarching limits imposed by the Constitution, which apply to
14

But see Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 307 (2007) (noting that many commentators argue that the United States “is
[still] bound to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty”).
15
Concerns about the constitutional limits of treaties in light of their prominence in the federal
legal structure were alive and well even during the Framing Era. See, e.g., Laura Moranchek Hussain,
Note, Enforcing the Treaty Rights of Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680, 683–84 (2008) (summarizing four main
critiques that began with Thomas Jefferson).
16
See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality requirements for the
treaty itself).
17
See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing the self-executing-treaty doctrine).
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treaties and to post-treaty pronouncements.18 As such, a post-treaty
pronouncement will be incorporated into U.S. law only if (1) it, too, is
constitutional and (2) the pronouncement was validly made in pursuance of
the treaty’s procedural law and the treaty organization’s substantive law.
However, because the pronouncement is not “the treaty,” this Note argues
that the pronouncement must occupy a lower level of precedence,
specifically at the same level as a federal statute. This allows states to
challenge pronouncements on grounds that the pronouncement interferes
with states’ rights, but creates a rebuttable presumption that the
pronouncements preempt state laws. This Note offers solutions to the
ambiguities of contemporary treaties and the problems they generate. But
given the complexity of the treaty regime, a complex solution is merited.
Part I provides historical background on treaties, focusing on how they
were viewed and addressed at the Framing, as well as how they have
changed in number, scope, and form over time. Part II then looks at
constitutional approaches to the treaty power in case law on the subject, as
well as in the scholarly literature to date. Part III articulates the proposed
tests and shows how they protect all relevant interests—international,
national, and state. Finally, this Note concludes with the importance and
implications of a more comprehensive approach to treaties.
I.

THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF TREATY REGIMES

Understanding the constitutional place of post-treaty pronouncements
and voluntary treaties requires examining the treatment of treaties
throughout the history of the United States. Section A briefly traces the
history of treaties in U.S. law, beginning with the Framers’ views on
treaties in order to provide an original understanding baseline. Sections B
and C then analyze the two ways in which treaties have transformed since
the Framing Era. Section B discusses the emergence of explicitly voluntary
treaties and treaty provisions, and Section C describes the growth of
international institutions and organizations making post-treaty
pronouncements.
A. Balancing Sovereignty and International Obligations: Treaties in
the Framing Era
According to the Framers, treaties should be entered into by virtuous
officeholders under a structure of governmental powers that best serves the

18
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people of the United States.19 The Framers acknowledged the tension
between establishing a national government to deal with the country’s
external affairs and with the rights of the states to govern themselves. They
believed that the United States had to observe the law of nations with
respect to foreign powers, and argued that this was best done through the
national government, rather than by the several states or groupings
thereof.20 One reason was that, for treaties to be meaningfully executed in
the United States, treaty obligations must be expounded evenly across the
states.21 The Framers’ concern for full and even execution was practical;
elsewhere in The Federalist Papers, they noted that perceived or actual
breach by one party to a treaty, even in just a part of the country, essentially
relieved the others of their own obligations, undermining the main goal of
cooperation underlying the treaty.22
In order to support the full enforcement of treaties, the Framers
located the treaty power in the federal government. Specifically, they
placed it in the concurrent hands of the executive—the President—and the

19

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 369 (John Jay) (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 2009). (“The
power of making treaties is an important one . . . and it should not be delegated but in such a mode . . .
as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men . . . in the manner most conducive to
the public good.”).
20
These concerns were not novel at the time the Constitution was written. Notably, the Articles of
Confederation also allocated the treaty-making power to the federal government, not to the states.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, § 1; see generally William W. Potter, Judicial Power in
the United States, 27 MICH. L. REV. 285, 285 (1929).
21
As Madison writes:
The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors speak their own propriety. Both
of them are comprised in the Articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former
is disembarrassed by the plan of the convention, of an exception under which treaties might be
substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving
“other public ministers and consuls” is expressly and very properly added to the former provision
concerning ambassadors.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 19, at 235 (James Madison) (emphasis added); see also John T.
Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1209, 1219–20 (2009) (describing John Jay’s pressing for the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy
Clause in light of his experiences negotiating treaties as the Confederation’s Secretary of Foreign
Affairs); Potter, supra note 20, at 309 (In drafting the Constitution, the Framers “provided that no state
should enter into any treaty or alliance or confederation . . . and in order to remove any doubt about the
supremacy of this direct legislation by the people, they declared this [C]onstitution and the laws made
in pursuance thereof and all treaties made or which shall be made to be the supreme law of the land.”).
22
The Framers addressed such reciprocity in their comparison of the governing structure under the
Articles of Confederation—perceived as a simple treaty between the several states—with their proposed
union:
It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties that all the articles are mutually conditions of
each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach,
committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to
pronounce the compact violated and void.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 19, at 250 (James Madison).
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Senate (or, rather, two-thirds thereof).23 This divided structure of the treaty
power was further motivated by the Framers’ fears of a tyrannical allpowerful executive, like the English King.24 More importantly for the
purposes of this Note, the same concern prompted the Framers to rank
treaties as among the sources of “the supreme Law of the Land,” next to the
Constitution itself.25 That the Framers noted the necessity of giving treaties
a paramount place in the structure of federal laws dovetails well with their
placing of the primary responsibility to enter into treaties—albeit with the
advice and consent of the Senate—in the federal executive.26
The Framers had less to say about how treaties were to be interpreted
for the purposes of enacting them domestically. This may be because
treaties at the time of the Framing were relatively simple agreements.27
Indeed, the United States did not even enter into any multilateral treaties
until 1825.28 Thus, interpreting treaties could hardly be seen as complicated
or contestable; domestic obligations under treaties would have been selfexplanatory without much, if any, further legislation.29 To the extent that
the Framers anticipated problems with treaty interpretation, they put final

23

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 19, at 398 (Alexander
Hamilton).
24
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 19, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (“In this respect, therefore,
there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British
sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of
the legislature.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 19, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary
monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper
to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years’ duration.”).
25
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 19, at 120 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and
operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the
law of the land.”).
26
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27
The French–American alliance treaties during the revolutionary period illustrate the relative
simplicity of early bilateral treaties. See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance Between the United States of America
and His Most Christian Majesty, Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6 [hereinafter Treaty of Alliance];
Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and His Most Christian Majesty,
Fr.-U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity and Commerce]. Each is written in both
English and French, yet the Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Amity and Commerce span only six and
twenty pages respectively (including both language versions), and establish obligations without creating
a formal organization or creating much space to expand the scope of their provisions.
28
1 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
1776-1949, at v (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968) (table of contents of a leading compilation of early
international agreements to which the United States was a signatory, showing that only bilateral
agreements existed until 1825).
29
Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 245 (“The Framers did not delve deeply into the question of
implementing legislation. They instead assumed that most treaties would not require it. As a result, the
relationship they intended between the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause has been the
subject of subsequent debate.”).
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authority of treaty interpretation in the Supreme Court, not in Congress.30
This was a logical decision in light of the Framers’ determination that
treaties are federal law and “the supreme Law of the Land,” alongside the
Constitution.31 This does not preclude Congress’s authority to enforce
treaties through statutes, but does subject such statutes to final review by
the courts. The explicit move to put final jurisdiction over issues of treaty
interpretation in the Supreme Court, rather than the other branches,
suggests that the Framers envisioned a strong role for the judiciary in
determining treaties as “higher law,” rather than applying the same plea for
judicial deference as in ordinary statutory interpretation cases.32
One limitation to the contemporary applicability of the Framers’
assumptions and beliefs regarding the treaty power is that those principles
came into being in a time when treaty regimes were relatively simple.
Nonetheless, looking to the Framers’ original understanding of how treaties
operated in the system of divided government they envisioned provides a
strong starting point for examining how and to what extent Framing Era
treaty principles apply today.
B. Managing Global Order in a Diversifying International Arena:
Voluntary Treaties
In recent years, treaties and treaty organizations have become more
complicated, in no small part due to the increasing role of nongovernmental
organizations in international law and politics,33 the increasing number of,
and diversity among, nation-states in the international world order,34 and
the wider scope of topics in which international law has become involved
30

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority . . . .”). As Hamilton notes with respect to treaties:
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by
judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be
submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be
instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 19, at 120–21 (Alexander Hamilton).
31
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32
See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 660 (2000) (suggesting courts’ deference to the
legislature should vary depending on the particular legal issue at hand); Louis J. Virelli III, Judicial
Deference to Congress and the Separation of Powers, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 28, 30–31 (2013) (linking
courts’ deference to Congress to areas in which no overlap between the branches’ authority is present).
33
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2624 (1997).
34
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006) (noting the quadrupling of
member states in the International Labor Organization (ILO) as one backdrop factor behind the changes
in the ILO over time).
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and intermixed with other complex laws.35 Because of the wide range of
nation-states’ resources and abilities to meet international standards,
international organizations have had to manage expectations to induce both
less-developed and more resistant nation-states to join and comply.36
Likewise, as international organizations’ mandates extended into ever
broader areas of law and regulation, properly managing these expectations
increased the willingness of nation-states—developed and developing
alike—to comply. Voluntary treaties adjusted to this new reality by setting
aspirational targets, rather than mandatory minima or maxima that had to
be met at pain of sanction.37 The flexibility these aspirational targets afford
countries fits a new context in which states vary drastically in their abilities
to meet certain goals.38 This is especially the case for international
agreements bearing on issues whose resolution would require significant
financial investment, human resources, and technological expenditures on
the part of member countries.39 Moreover, for developed and developing
countries alike, voluntary targets allow governments some leeway to
manage their sometimes conflicting diplomatic obligations to other nations
with their domestic obligations to their national electorates.40 Despite
35

Koh, supra note 33, at 2614 (“In the wake of . . . World War II, the architects of the postwar
system replaced the preexisting loose customary web of state-centric rules with an ambitious positivistic
order, built on institutions and constitutions: international institutions governed by multilateral treaties
organizing proactive assaults on all manner of global problems.”). For an illustrative description of how
international treaties have come to comprehensively regulate investment, see Joost Pauwelyn, Dealing
with the Increasing Complexity of Investment-Related Treaties: A Framework and Some Policy
Guidelines, 3 INV. TREATY NEWS 5 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/iisd_itn_october_2012_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZD4-XC62].
36
Koh, supra note 33, at 2636–38.
37
For example, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty imposes the following “soft”
obligations without penalty of sanction in case of failure: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.” NPT, supra note 7, art. VI. Another example, in the
form of a post-treaty pronouncement, is the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, which set
health and education targets for developing countries, which are not explicitly penalized when not met.
G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. MDGs].
38
The Kyoto Protocol is an instructive example, given the wide variation in signatories’ abilities to
implement carbon-reducing technologies. The Protocol sets certain obligations for more advanced
Annex I countries, which are not extended to non-Annex I countries. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, art.
2, § 1.
39
See, e.g., Randall Lutter, Developing Countries’ Greenhouse Emissions: Uncertainty and
Implications for Participation in the Kyoto Protocol, 21 ENERGY J. 93, 93–94 (2000) (noting that the
Kyoto Protocol gives developing countries the option, but not the obligation, to match developed
country signatories’ carbon emissions caps).
40
The field of international relations construes this dilemma as a “multilevel game,” where
different obligations and resources at the international diplomacy level and the domestic political level
provide both obstacles and opportunities for government representatives in international negotiations.
See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).

1244

110:1235 (2016)

The Modern Treaty-Executing Power

arguments that this flexible structure undermines accountability, and
ultimately success, to allow even developing countries this license,41
voluntary treaties remain an essential part of the international law regime
today.
To the extent that treaties with voluntary, aspirational targets still
depend on signatory nation-states’ voluntary compliance due to the absence
of a global sovereign, some scholars have argued that the emergence of
voluntary treaties would result in no real divergence from the prior state of
international relations.42 Whatever the ramifications of this development for
international politics scholars, voluntary treaties do pose a significant
problem for legal scholars trying to determine the boundaries of domestic
treaty interpretation and enforcement. This issue is best framed through the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution: given that an
international agreement imposes obligations that are not mandatory, and
that the United States may face no sanction if it violates those obligations,
what, if anything, can Congress enact through statute that is truly
“necessary and proper” for the enforcement of and compliance with the
treaty?43 This perplexing question illustrates why voluntary treaties pose a
unique constitutional issue that sets them apart from mandatory
agreements.
41

Not all authors believe flexibility in treaty goals based on level of development is a good thing.
See, e.g., Mac Darrow, The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights
Priorities for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 55, 59–60 (2012)
(noting the common argument that the lack of a strong accountability mechanism for U.N. MDGs
undermines their enforcement).
42
Two important lines of scholarship in this area are efficient breach theory and realist
international relations. Efficient breach scholarship emphasizes that, regardless of the “hardness” or
“softness” of rules, parties will breach an agreement if doing so is more beneficial to them than
upholding their obligations. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International
Law: Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243,
254–55 (2011) (arguing that countries may breach in order to retaliate against other noncompliant
countries); Note, (In)Efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of the “Free Pass” After
China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARV. L. REV. 602, 602–03 (2011) (acknowledging that
states may defect from agreements when they can expect a “free pass” from the regulating body).
Realist international relations scholars focus on anarchy in international relations: nation-states’
decisionmaking is constrained less by formal institutions and more by informal power structures and
relative relationships in an international arena without a true ruling sovereign. See, e.g., Joseph M.
Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 487 (1988) (arguing that nation-states’ cooperation depends on
concerns about others cheating and their concerns about the relative gains of other states); Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 469, 478 (2005) (noting that traditional realist theory expects enforcement and compliance to
depend on the interests of the most powerful states).
43
Even recently, the definition of “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause has remained at
issue. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356, 386–88 (1819) (arguing that
“necessary” means “needful and adapted,” not “absolutely necessary” or indispensable), with Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (Sebelius), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (arguing that “necessary”
covers exercises only of “authority derivative of, and in service to, a granted power”).
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C. Beyond the Four Corners of the Treaty:
Post-Treaty Pronouncements
Another complication emerged when treaties began setting up new
institutions and organizations to enforce their directives. The United States
has been involved in several such institution-creating treaties, including
those that gave rise to the U.N.,44 NATO,45 and the WTO.46 Such
institutions were created to centralize the authority needed to expound on
the foundational principles in their establishing treaties, as well as to
enforce those principles and others that may emerge later.47 At least in part,
treaty institutions hoped to be the missing third-party enforcement
mechanisms that made most international politics essentially voluntary for
nation-states,48 though some have argued that, for various reasons, they
tend to be rather ineffective at performing this function.49
Regardless of international institutions’ efficacy, an important
consequence of this development is that treaty organizations enact their
own law in varying ways, including the adoption of resolutions, which
resembles legislative lawmaking, and the resolution of disputes in
international judiciary-like institutions.50 Such post-treaty pronouncements,
while helpful in forwarding the goals of the treaty organization itself, pose
a conundrum for U.S. constitutional law. The pronouncements are clearly
44

U.N. Charter.
North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 10.
46
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
47
See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 707 (1999); see generally Michael J. Gilligan & Leslie
Johns, Formal Models of International Institutions, 15 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 221 (2012) (reviewing
literature on forms and functions of international institutions).
48
See Gilligan & Johns, supra note 47, at 225; see also Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North &
Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges,
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 3 (1990) (“In a large community . . . it would be too
costly to keep everyone informed about what transpires in all trading relationships, as a simple
reputation system might require. So the system of private judges is designed to promote private
resolution of disputes and otherwise to transmit just enough information . . . to enable the reputation
mechanism to function effectively for enforcement.”) (emphasis in original).
49
Some point out treaty organizations’ lack of resources as a key problem for enforcement. See,
e.g., Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Combating
Corruption: Theory and Practice, 44 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 615, 621 (2011); Kevin Kolben, The
WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 482 (2010). Others are more concerned that treaty
organizations are prone to be captured by certain powerful nation-states, rendering them imperfect
enforcement organs against these captor countries. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of
Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339,
365 (2002) (noting that the WTO has become less effective in regulating powerful nation-states due to
organizational capture).
50
See supra notes 8–9 (giving examples of resolutions by different organs of the U.N. and cases at
the DSB).
45
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not “treaties,” since the President of the United States did not directly sign
these pronouncements with the advice and consent of the Senate.51 Nor is
there necessarily any input by any party directly accountable to the people
of the United States in these resolutions and judgments. Finally, at least one
commentator has raised the concern that granting authority to treaty bodies
to engage in the production of post-treaty pronouncements raises red flags
under the nondelegation doctrine.52
Yet to refuse enforcing post-treaty pronouncements altogether may
undermine the very purpose of the United States in joining the original
treaty, which itself is “the supreme Law of the Land.”53 For treaties
generating post-treaty pronouncements, part of the original treaty itself is
the creation of an organization whose purpose is to expound on the original
treaty. The United States is aware of the creation of the treaty organization
upon ratification—and in its ratification, the United States consents to
subject itself to the organization’s powers as enshrined in the original
treaty. Unless the United States intends to eschew its international
obligations—and indeed, its own Constitution—it must find a way to
incorporate post-treaty pronouncements into its own laws. But in light of
the constitutional conflicts discussed above, it is critical to carefully craft
the conditions for and the manner of incorporation of post-treaty
pronouncements into federal law. The question is what level of precedence
acts in pursuance of those post-treaty pronouncements should receive.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY POWER
Part II considers existing approaches from the judiciary and legal
scholars to modern treaties and whether they adequately address the
complications discussed above. Section A first examines leading Supreme
Court cases that bear on the constitutional place of treaties. Section B then
explores legal scholarship considering the quandaries of contemporary
treaty doctrine. Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that both areas of legal
thought fall short of adequately addressing the complexity posed by
modern treaties.

51

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting power to enter into treaties to the President, but only
with the advice and consent of the Senate).
52
Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1569–70 (2003).
53
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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A. A Lukewarm Approach: Supreme Court Jurisprudence on
Treaty Implementation
The Supreme Court has addressed the standard for a treaty-enforcing
statute’s constitutional validity in several cases. The doctrine that has
evolved, however, both reaches an unsatisfying conclusion on how
domestic and international obligations should constitutionally be balanced,
and leaves ambiguous the answers to several legal questions raised earlier
in this Note.
In the seminal case Missouri v. Holland,54 the Supreme Court rightly
noted that enforcement of a treaty by statute runs into an issue of
conflicting dual sovereignties, namely, the conflicting sovereignties of the
states and of the federal government.55 In this case, the U.S. and Canada
(then under the dominion of the United Kingdom) entered into a treaty to
regulate the hunting of migratory birds.56 The State of Missouri rejected the
congressional act implementing the treaty, and argued it infringed on its
Tenth Amendment powers and was therefore unconstitutional.57
The primary test the Court imposed on acts of Congress enforcing
treaties is whether the treaty itself is constitutionally valid; if so, an act of
Congress enforcing the provisions of that treaty would clearly be necessary
and proper to give legal effect to the treaty within the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.58 The Court noted that, unlike acts of
Congress, whose validity depends on whether they were “made in
pursuance of the Constitution,” treaties’ validity depends on whether they
were “made under the authority of the United States,” which the Court
noted ambiguously may or may not refer to the Constitution.59 Finding no
constitutional infringement by the treaty at issue—including no overstep of
Missouri’s reserved state powers in violation of the Tenth Amendment—
the Court found that the statute supporting a bilateral treaty regulating the

54

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 420–21, 432–33.
56
Id. at 430–31.
57
Id. at 431.
58
Id. at 432; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
59
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433; see also id. (“It is open to question whether the authority of the United
States means more than the formal acts prescribed [in the Constitution] to make the convention.”);
Samar, supra note 1, at 306 (noting that the “Authority of the United States” in Justice Holmes’s test is
distinct from, and broader than, mere constitutionality). Professor Samar argues that, because Holland
clearly distinguished the “Authority of the United States” test from a simple constitutionality inquiry,
courts opining on the validity of a particular treaty must look beyond to general principles “to which
Americans are so attached,” including “justice, fairness, due process, and liberty.” Samar, supra note 1,
at 357.
55
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hunting of migratory birds was valid. Consequently, the statute Congress
enacted to enforce it was valid.60
The Court elaborated on its Holland holding in later cases. In Reid v.
Covert,61 the Court appeared to turn away from Justice Holmes’s distinction
between the underlying validity test for acts of Congress and for treaties in
Holland,62 instead finding constitutionality of the act of Congress itself—
not just the treaty on which it was based—was the proper test for the
validity of treaties and treaty enforcement.63 The Supreme Court thus found
the treaty at issue in Reid, which granted jurisdiction over U.S. civilians on
military bases abroad to the U.S. military courts, unconstitutional because
enforcing it would violate the civilians’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.64
Later, in Bond v. United States,65 the Court faced a statute interpreting
and enforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention.66 Writing for a 9–0
Court, Chief Justice Roberts resolved the case not on constitutional
grounds, but instead dismissed the criminal case against petitioner Ms.
Bond based on the Court’s judgment that the enforcing statute did not reach
her conduct.67 Three concurring Justices, however, would have preferred to
resolve the case through an analysis of the limits of the treaty power in a
federal constitutional context. Justice Scalia argued that the statute in
question, as in Reid, did violate the Bill of Rights by infringing on states’
reserved power to regulate local criminal law under the Tenth
Amendment.68 Justices Thomas and Alito, writing separate concurrences,
found a different constitutional violation: the statute was an improper
60

Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
62
252 U.S. at 433.
63
Reid, 354 U.S. at 16 (“There is nothing in [the] language [of the Supremacy Clause] which
intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of
the Constitution.”).
64
Id. at 19. The Court also considered whether anything else in the Constitution would authorize
military court jurisdiction over U.S. civilians on U.S. foreign military bases, and found no such
provision. Id. at 21 n.40 and accompanying text (holding that Congress’s power “to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces” under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14 does not
permit this jurisdiction); id. at 40–41 (holding that the U.S. Constitution only allows courts of law, and
not military tribunals, to try civilians for crimes).
65
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
66
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No.
103–21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons
Convention]. The statute involved in Bond implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention by making
it a federal crime to knowingly “possess[] or use . . . any chemical weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1)
(2012).
67
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
68
Id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
61
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exercise of the Treaty Power because such an exercise could only be valid
if the implementing statute had a sufficient nexus with foreign affairs.69 For
both Justices, a local criminal law certainly could not meet this standard.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing head-on the
complex issues raised by voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements
was in Medellin v. Texas.70 Mr. Medellin was convicted of murder,
sentenced to death, and imprisoned pending execution in Texas.71 He was
one of fifty-one Mexican nationals detained by the United States who were
parties to an International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, referred to as
Avena,72 which ruled that fifty-one of those detained Mexican nationals had
not been properly informed of their rights under the Vienna Convention.73
Mr. Medellin relied on the ICJ ruling and on a presidential memorandum
purporting to give domestic effect to that ruling in order to file a second
habeas application in Texas state court challenging his death sentence on
the grounds that he was not informed of his Vienna Convention rights.74 In
rejecting Mr. Medellin’s habeas petition, the Supreme Court held that the
ICJ ruling did not have domestic legal effect.75 The majority ruled that any
international obligation only has domestic legal effect if it is either (1)
enforced by Congress pursuant to its authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause—not by the President through a memorandum—or (2) if it is
self-executing.76 A treaty is self-executing only if it “operates of itself

69

Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
70
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
71
Id. at 498.
72
Id. at 497–98; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment,
2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 15 (Mar. 31).
73
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–98; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 106 (Mar. 31) (citing Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
opened for signature Apr. 24 1963, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19,
1967) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]).
74
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 504–05 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.
253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); Igartua–De La
Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J.)). The Court explained
the self-executing treaty doctrine in an early case:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
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without the aid of any legislative provision.”77 However, the ICJ ruling did
not so operate, because the Optional Protocol,78 which the United States
ratified and under which the United States agreed to ICJ jurisdiction over
Vienna Convention disputes, granted jurisdiction to the ICJ but lacked any
language describing the domestic enforceability of ICJ cases decided under
this grant of jurisdiction.79 Because Congress had not enacted a statute
domestically enforcing Avena or ICJ rulings generally, the Court held that
Avena had no domestic enforceability whatsoever.
The Medellin rule unsatisfactorily allows the United States to formally
subject itself to international organizations and treaties, but to get out of its
obligations because Congress was haphazard or devious in failing to
implement a ratified treaty with sufficiently strong language. Medellin also
does not address the strength of language required for a treaty to become
self-executing, leaving ambiguity in how its own rule would be enforced in
the future. Additionally, Medellin does not address the problem of
precedence discussed above: if domestically enforceable, would the
pronouncements under such treaties also be part of the supreme law of the
land, even if these pronouncements technically are not treaties?80 Finally, to
the issue of treaties with language that is more indefinite and aspirational
than mandatory, Medellin suggests that such treaties simply would be
unenforceable due to the softness of the text—certainly an absurd result
that runs afoul of U.S. ratification of that treaty. As such, Supreme Court
jurisprudence to date leaves U.S. obligations under post-treaty
pronouncements and voluntary treaties up in the air.
B. Too Narrow a Debate: Treaties in Scholarly Literature
Scholarly literature on the treaty power has much to say about what
rules govern the kinds of treaties the United States can enter.81 For the
77

Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 314); see also Charles W. Stotter, Comment,
Self-Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A Separation
of Powers Problem, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 773, 773 (1976).
78
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (entered
into force Mar. 19, 1967) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
79
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507–08 (“The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ decision and
does not itself commit signatories to comply with an ICJ judgment. The Protocol is similarly silent as to
any enforcement mechanism.”).
80
See supra Section I.C.
81
For example, scholars have raised concerns about the constitutionality of executive agreements
and presidential memoranda, which fail the “advice and consent of the Senate” requirement. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 391–92 (1998);
A. Mark Weisburd, International Judicial Decisions, Domestic Courts, and the Foreign Affairs Power,
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 287, 319–20. They have also considered whether treaty obligations involve
impermissible commandeering of the states. See Bradley, supra, at 409; Hathaway et al., supra note 1,
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purposes of this Note, however, the more salient question is what limits can
or should be imposed on the domestic enforcement of treaties—and the
pronouncements that follow them. This Note presumes that a treaty has
been properly made, thereby skipping past direct consideration of limits on
the treaty-making power.
The existing literature only indirectly addresses the issue of voluntary
treaties. The main discussion centers on whether treaties should be
presumed to be self-executing,82 barring language expressly providing
otherwise,83 or whether treaties should presumptively be non-selfexecuting, unless the language makes clear that the treaty can be enforced
without further legislation.84 Opponents of a presumption that treaties are
self-executing claim that this presumption undermines checks on the extent
of the federal government’s treaty power.85 In contrast, supporters of a
presumption of self-execution base their claim on the language of the
Supremacy Clause, which puts treaties alongside the Constitution as the
law of the land.86
at 271–74; Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty
Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1261 (2000). Still others have considered whether Article I or II grants of
power to Congress and the President impose subject matter limitations on what treaties are permissible.
See Bradley, supra, at 453 (arguing that one way to limit what subjects treaties can cover is to permit
them only when an issue “needs” international cooperation); Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 290–99
(finding treaties to be valid only if they are not a pretext for the federal government infringing on the
rights of states and if there is a reasonable international purpose for the treaty). Finally, authors have
questioned whether federalism bars treaties that interfere impermissibly with states’ rights and powers.
See Bradley, supra, at 411 (arguing that the Framers expected treaties only to cover issues that were
truly international—such as war, peace, and commerce—and are therefore inappropriate to regulate
state issues); Swaine, supra, at 1138, 1142–43, 1146–48 (arguing that “dormant foreign affairs” and
“dormant treaty” powers exist, because the Constitution locates both these powers in the federal
government, not the states); Benjamin Beiter, Note, Beyond Medellin: Reconsidering Federalism Limits
on the Treaty Power, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1163, 1175–76 (2010) (suggesting a presumption that
treaties are non-self-executing as a means to rein in the federal government’s treaty-making power).
82
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83
See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1175 (arguing that a non-self-execution presumption imposes
proper federalism checks on the federal government); id. at 1183 (arguing that Medellin created such a
presumption). While treaties may be non-self-executing because they are insufficiently emphatic in
their language, Professor Damrosch notes that the Senate has also turned treaties non-self-executing by
declaring qualified consent to the President that the treaty should not be used as a direct source of law in
domestic courts. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “SelfExecuting” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 515 (1991).
84
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 1, at 357 (arguing that the non-self-executing treaty doctrine flies in
the face of the Supremacy Clause’s clear language); Vazquez, supra note 1, at 602 (noting that because
the Supremacy Clause puts treaties on parity with the Constitution, it would not make sense to require
them to be subject to the self-executing inquiry). Professor Hathaway and colleagues argue that the
Framers did not address the self-execution question because they assumed most treaties, if not all,
would be. Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 250.
85
See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1187–88.
86
Carter, supra note 1, at 345; see also Vazquez, supra note 1, at 615–16 (arguing that the Framers
wrote the Supremacy Clause explicitly to contravene the British approach, under which treaties were
not enforceable as domestic law).
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However, the debate about whether treaties are self-executing does not
resolve the issue of voluntary treaties.87 Whether a treaty requires further
legislation to enforce its contents is a separate issue from whether its
contents suggest voluntary or mandatory targets. The closest the literature
comes to addressing voluntary treaties is in Professor Vazquez’s discussion
of aspirational treaties.88 However, Professor Vazquez only defines such
treaties in the abstract, without discussing the implications of the
aspirational or indefinite language or the extent to which they may be
executed, by statute or by presumption.89 As such, we remain in the dark on
this topic.
Existing scholarship says even less about post-treaty pronouncements.
One viewpoint on this issue argues that a post-treaty pronouncement should
be automatically enforceable as domestic law so long as the originating
treaty is itself valid, implying that the pronouncement is a simple extension
of the treaty and is thus entitled to similar constitutional precedence.90 The
main countervailing opinion argues that simply granting jurisdiction to an
international organization on a domestic case regarding issues in a treaty is
insufficient; for that organization’s judgment to be as effective as domestic
law, it would require explicit language in either the jurisdiction-granting
treaty or in a separate statute enforcing the judgment domestically.91 This
latter position effectively analogizes post-treaty pronouncements to
separate, individual treaties, and applies the self-executing treaty doctrine
to them as such.
Discussions regarding the proper level of precedence for international
law only directly address whether treaties should be considered on par or
below the Constitution, thus failing to distinguish the treaty from the posttreaty pronouncement.92 Implicitly, this discussion touches on the level of
87

See also infra Section III.A (elaborating on the self-executing treaty doctrine in the test for
voluntary treaties).
88
Vazquez, supra note 12, at 966.
89
Id. (“Distinguishing aspirational from obligatory treaties will not always be an easy task. I do not
address that issue here beyond noting that the aspirational category I have in mind consists of treaties
that would not be violated even if nothing were done to implement them.”).
90
See, e.g., Samar, supra note 1, at 345–46. Professor Samar goes even further by arguing that, in
cases where the United States has properly submitted itself to the jurisdiction of an international court,
such a court, not any U.S. federal or state court (the U.S. Supreme Court included), should be the final
arbiter of matters over which the international court has jurisdiction based on its originating treaty. Id.
91
See, e.g., Beiter, supra note 81, at 1194–95.
92
For example, Professor Bradley, who argues against a self-executing presumption, claims that
treaties should have a lower rank than the Constitution, equivalent to acts of Congress. Bradley, supra
note 81, at 456–58. In contrast, other authors argue that the Supremacy Clause is clear in putting
treaties—and impliedly, post-treaty pronouncements—on the same level as the Constitution,
preempting all other federal or state law. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 1, at 349; Vazquez, supra note 1,
at 602.
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precedence, albeit simplistically—either the pronouncement is an extension
of the treaty, and is therefore entitled to treaty-level precedence, or it is not,
and is therefore entitled to no precedence. In light of the concerns
mentioned earlier in this Note, both these answers are unsatisfactory.93
Thus, the literature to date answers neither of the two questions this Note
poses regarding post-treaty pronouncements: (1) under what conditions
they should be enforceable as domestic law and (2) whether their departure
from the typical treaty procedure means they should be granted lesser
precedence in U.S. law. After all, just because acts of Congress are made in
pursuance of the Constitution does not grant them equal status to the
Constitution; why should post-treaty pronouncements be granted greater
deference?
III. RESOLVING THE GAP: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO TREATIES
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, academic scholarship and current
jurisprudence alike fall short of addressing the complexities of
contemporary treaties. On the one hand, these shortcomings stem from an
overly simplistic approach to treaty incorporation and enforcement,
reducing such questions to surface-level inquiries, such as whether a treaty
is self-executing, or whether the treaty itself violates the Tenth
Amendment. On the other hand, it is possible that scholarship on treaties
simply has not kept up with changes in international treaty regime realities.
This Part attempts to address the complexities of both voluntary
treaties and post-treaty pronouncements by proposing separate
constitutional inquiries for each, thereby applying necessarily more
complex solutions to more complex constitutional quandaries. The
assumption at this point in the analysis is that the treaty itself has already
been established as constitutionally valid; the remaining inquiry is how it
and the post-treaty pronouncements it generates will be incorporated into
U.S. law. Section A first proposes a two-step reasonableness inquiry for
implementing voluntary treaties by statute. Section B then describes the
mechanics and qualifications for incorporating post-treaty pronouncements
into the structure of federal law.

93

See supra Section I.C (arguing that giving post-treaty pronouncements treaty-level precedence is
inappropriate given the constitutional requirements for treaty making, but also that giving them no
precedence is likewise improper because doing so lets the United States sidestep treaties that grant
jurisdiction to an international organization with post-treaty pronouncement-making authority).
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A. A Doubly-Reasonable Interpretive Approach to Voluntary Treaties
The enforceable substance of voluntary treaties must be interpreted in
light of what is “reasonable.” The reasonableness approach to treaties is not
without precedent. For example, Professor Hathaway and colleagues argue
that, as a limit to the treaty-making power under federalism and separation
of powers principles, all treaties and statutes implementing them must pass
a “reasonable international purpose” test.94 Echoing concurrences by
Justices Alito95 and Thomas96 in Bond, they stress that the President’s treaty
power must be limited in light of his or her foreign affairs power; likewise,
Congress’s power to implement treaties (and the President’s power to
execute them) should be constrained to matters with a nonpretextual link to
foreign affairs.97 This nexus is established by demonstrating a “benefit to
concluding an international agreement as opposed to enacting domestic
legislation.”98
A reasonableness approach is particularly important for statutory
implementation of voluntary treaties because by definition, the language of
such treaties is somewhat vague as to what exactly is demanded of the
United States.99 This inherent vagueness bears important weight on the selfexecuting presumption as applied to voluntary treaties specifically. As a
threshold matter, voluntary treaties as defined in this Note should be treated
as presumptively non-self-executing because, regardless of specific
language in the text of the treaty authorizing the federal government to
enforce a voluntary treaty, what “enforcement” is remains unclear.
Consider a hypothetical treaty with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. If the treaty states that its members should “aspire” to reduce
their “emissions” by “50% in the next fifteen years,” can the United States
establish a statute cutting federal funding to states that are unable to reduce
their emissions following these exact parameters? Can the federal
government impose an intermediate target, such as requiring states to
reduce their emissions by 25% in the next ten years, by statute? Can the
EPA enact a regulation that specifically defines “emissions” for purposes
of calculating reductions to include lead and particulates, but not carbon
dioxide? This hypothetical illustrates the problem with assuming that a
voluntary treaty is clear with respect to its obligations. The threshold

94
95
96
97
98
99

Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 299.
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2111 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 303.
Id. at 299.
See supra Section II.B.
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presumption that voluntary treaties are non-self-executing most reasonably
reconciles the obligation of the United States to fulfill its duties under
international agreements with the necessity that abidance with purposely
indefinite terms must be clarified statutorily.100
Once Congress codifies a voluntary treaty in an enforcing statute—
required for the treaty’s implementation by the threshold presumption
prescribed above—a twofold reasonableness inquiry should govern the
constitutional analysis. First, the statute must be a reasonable interpretation
of the language and goals of the treaty. Second, the extent of the obligation
the statute prescribes must be reasonable in light of U.S. involvement in the
treaty.
1.

Reasonableness in Light of the Language and Goals
of the Treaty.—The first reasonableness analysis, which
considers the language and goals of the treaty, parallels ordinary statutory
interpretation. However, this Note prescribes a specifically textualist–
originalist approach at this stage unless doing so is impossible.101 A textfocused analysis is both feasible and advisable in the case of treaty
interpretation. Treaties typically begin with a preamble specifically stating
the purposes and goals of the treaty; in light of this deliberate clarity and
structure, it seems imprudent to impute rationales for the treaty from nontextual sources.102 Likewise, given the already vague nature of obligations
under a voluntary treaty, it seems irrational to impute more to the language
stating member states’ obligations than is already on paper. Exceptions to
100

See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
Textualist–originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus on the explicit language
of the document, with some looking to the original intent of the Framers or the original public meaning
of words used in the Framing Era. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 948–49 (2008) (finding no constitutional support for the
principle of stare decisis in the text of the Constitution or from Framing Era practice); Michael B.
Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1550–
51 (2005) (interpreting the text and meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3, using practice from the Framing Era). An analogous approach for treaties would focus only
on the text of the treaty, including the preamble. Critics of textualist–originalist approaches argue that
any interpretation of “original meaning” or “original intent” of constitutional text, and analogously here,
of treaty text, imports not a true “original meaning or intent,” but rather what the reader wants the
original meaning or intent to be. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review,
Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism”
Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (2012) (arguing that “originalist jurists are effectively
empowered to engage in exactly the type of ideologically driven, outcome-determinative analysis that
originalism claims to be designed to prevent”); Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 1007, 1012–13 (2011) (arguing that judges claiming to apply textualism may be interpreting
constitutional provisions based on their desired consequences, rather than based on the actual text).
102
See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl. (NATO members “are resolved,” among
other things, “to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and
security.”); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, pmbl. (noting that parties act “[i]n pursuit of the ultimate
objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2” (emphasis omitted)).
101
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the proposed general rule that interpreting voluntary treaties should begin
and end with the text of the treaty—most frequently, its preamble—can and
must be made where the text is ineluctably vague. For example,
interpreting when U.N. members may authorize the use of armed force
against another member requires determining when doing so is, per the
language of the preamble, “in the common interest.”103 A preference for
textualist–originalist interpretations of a treaty’s purposes and goals where
possible provides a prudent outer limit to interpreting what is reasonable in
light of the treaty.
One might argue that this threshold reasonableness test is too narrow.
Consequently, courts should defer to Congress’s intent as it might be
expressed elsewhere: in the implementing statute, in the congressional
record discussing the potential adoption of the treaty, and so forth.
However, debates leading up to the adoption of the treaty, where they
diverge from the actual treaty, are less dispositive than the actual, final
version of the treaty—and rightly so, given the constitutional posture of
treaties.104 Indeed, if there is a difference between pre-ratification
documents and the actual content of the treaty, the final version should
trump draft discussions and language. Although treaties have changed
drastically since the Framing Era, the principle of limiting interpretation to
the four corners of the treaty, where possible, remains just as prudent.
2.

Reasonableness in Light of U.S. Involvement in the
Treaty.—If a statute passes the first reasonableness test, the
next hurdle is that the extent of the obligation the statute prescribes must be
reasonable in light of U.S. involvement in the treaty. As used here, “extent”
is a catchall term referring to the scope of the specific statutory
interpretation of a treaty’s provisions. Extent may refer, for example, to
whether treaty obligations are enforced in a mandatory or aspirational
manner, the level of compliance enforced (e.g., the concentration level of
environmental pollutants deemed legally acceptable), whether penalties for
domestic violations are criminal or civil, and so forth.105 One inevitably
cannot conduct this analysis on a purely textualist–originalist basis, since
the language of the treaty itself combines the input of many countries’
representatives without demarcating where U.S. representatives were

103

U.N. Charter pmbl. (U.N. members aim “to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace
and security” in part by “ensur[ing] . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest.”).
104
See supra Section II.A (discussing the Framers’ intent in giving treaties the status of supreme
law of the land).
105
See supra Section II.B.
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involved, at least not explicitly in the treaty.106 Admittedly, then, this
second reasonableness test is more fact-specific and has the potential to be
more malleable. However, because the goal of this prong is to identify
specific U.S. involvement in the treaty, and because the internationally
cooperative nature of writing the final text of a treaty makes imprudent a
presumption that the plain text of the treaty alone can shed light on U.S.
involvement, using a broader test strikes the best balance between the goals
of the constitutional test set forth herein and the realities of treaty
interpretation.
Reasonableness in light of U.S. involvement requires looking into two
factors, based on the two main reasons why nation-states began entering
into voluntary treaties in the first place.107 First, is it reasonable given the
level of commitment to the treaty the United States expressed? This
requires examining the record of legislative and executive deliberations in
deciding to ratify the treaty. This record may reveal what priorities the
Senate considered in ratifying the treaty, how the Senate envisioned the
United States complying with its aspirational language, what limitations the
Senate saw to compliance, and so forth—all of which shed light on the
United States’ intended commitment at the time of the treaty ratification.
As noted earlier, the President may only enter into treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate.108 For this reason, it is likely that a rich record of
at least the Senate’s deliberations exist for the purpose of this analysis.109
For older treaties, courts have the benefit of looking additionally to the
United States’ “course of performance,” in the same way that courts look to
course of performance to interpret contractual obligations.110 However,
where the record and course of performance diverge and ample evidence
for both is available, the record should prevail, because later performance is
less dispositive regarding what the United States originally intended when
it entered the treaty. If anything, divergence between the record and course

106

See, e.g., MALLARD, supra note 7, at 7–9 (discussing this point in the context of the NPT).
See supra Section II.B.
108
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
109
The legislative history of the statutory incorporation of the pre-WTO Uruguay Round
Agreements provides an illustrative example. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3624 (2012)) [hereinafter URAA].
The congressional database suggests that the URAA was referred for discussion to at least eight
committees in the House of Representatives, two of which wrote official reports. Committees: H.R.
Congress
(1993–1994),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd5110–103rd
congress/house-bill/5110/committees?q=%7B”search”%3A%5B”Pub.+L.+103-465”%5D%7D
[https://perma.cc/U6PU-6H6B]. This does not even include potential floor discussions in the House, nor
does it include potential committee and floor discussions in the Senate.
110
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-208 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2007); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
107
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of performance should indicate that the United States is currently straying
from what it originally agreed to—a violation of its original intent in
entering the treaty, not a meaningful illustration thereof.111 Ultimately,
“level of commitment” is an intent-based test assessed at the time the treaty
was entered into. Hence, the ratification-period record should take
precedence over later actions in interpreting the level of commitment.
Second, is the statute reasonable given the ability or willingness of the
United States to comply? Voluntary treaty obligations are typically entered
into to manage the inability or unwillingness of potential signatories to
meet stiffer standards, so this is a prudent factor to consider.112 As with the
first factor, courts may look to the record to assess this factor, though the
analysis is more complex. The United States’ ability or willingness to
comply may have changed since the inception of the treaty, and treaties
with voluntary or sliding-scale obligations usually ratchet up obligations
accordingly through a tier-based classification system.113 Hence, under this
factor, ability or willingness at the inception of the treaty does not trump
ability or willingness at the time the enacting statute became law (or even
at the time the case is before the court). If treaty obligations do change
based on ability or willingness over time, it seems prudent to give
precedence to more recent ability or willingness in analyzing this factor,
not to ability or willingness at the inception of the treaty—as long as the
extent of the obligation enshrined in Congress’s implementing statute is
within the range of compliance the United States acceded to by ratifying
the treaty in the first place.114
One possible critique of the commitment and ability–willingness
factors under the second reasonableness test is that prior U.S. commitment
might very well conflict with current ability or willingness to comply.
Indeed, divergence between the two could signify the United States’
backsliding on its treaty obligations. However, a statistical analogy

111

Of course, divergence between course of performance and original intent at ratification may
indicate a desire to abrogate one’s treaty obligations altogether—that is, to abandon the treaty. This
Note presumes that the United States has not expressly rejected, nor evinced an intent to leave, a treaty
whose implementation by statute is under consideration.
112
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
113
See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 13, art. 10 (describing the differing obligations between
developed member states in the Protocol’s Annex I and developing states not in Annex I). Compare
NPT, supra note 7, art. I (describing the obligations of “nuclear-weapon State Part[ies]” neither to
transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient nor to induce any country to seek nuclear weapons), with id.
art. II (describing the obligations of “non-nuclear-weapon State Part[ies]” not to receive nuclear
weapons in the future).
114
Of course, if the treaty-executing statute does not fall in the range of compliance the United
States accepted under the final version of the treaty, then the statute plainly runs afoul of the treaty and
is by definition not within Congress’s treaty-executing power.
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illuminates why these two factors complement, rather than contradict, each
other. As mentioned above, when the United States agrees to a voluntary
treaty, it agrees to a range of possibly acceptable obligations.115 Hence, the
intent-based commitment test is best viewed as a means to determine a
“confidence interval” within which the United States can choose a variety
of policy outcomes and still technically be in compliance with the treaty.116
The ability–willingness factor, then, specifically places current U.S.
compliance along that axis of permissible policy outcomes. First, if the
current state of treaty compliance is within the commitment test’s
confidence interval, then the United States is formally compliant with the
treaty. If it does not fall in that range, the United States is formally
violating its obligations. Second, the ability–willingness factor allows the
United States to reasonably craft its method for complying with treaties
based on its current limitations. After all, the whole point of a voluntary
treaty is providing allowance for different levels of compliance, so long as
they are within the acceptable range stipulated by the treaty.117
The constitutional test proposed for voluntary treaties in this Note is
admittedly complex, but necessarily so. The presumption of non-selfexecution acknowledges the paradoxically explicit vagueness of voluntary
treaties, while the two-step reasonableness analysis provides a boundary for
statutory implementation where the text of the treaty is insufficiently
specific. This analysis best balances the international and domestic
concerns that abound in such treaties.
B. Not Treaties, But Made Pursuant Thereto: Incorporating
Post-Treaty Pronouncements
Once a treaty capable of generating post-treaty pronouncements is
properly ratified and executed domestically, courts must grapple with
115

See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
The “confidence interval” is a critical concept in statistics. A classical statistical conundrum is
that one who wishes to study a particular variable or parameter in a population can only study a sample
of the population. For example, while data obtained from a sample can identify the mean value—one
paradigmatic parameter statisticians measure—in that sample, that data cannot conclusively identify the
true mean in the entire population. A statistician can therefore only estimate the true value of that
parameter, and he or she must thus indicate the extent to which he or she is certain that this estimated
value is the parameter’s true value. The confidence interval is calculated based on sample data to
estimate a range within which a statistician can be somewhat sure the true parameter value for the entire
population is, and the degree of confidence is denoted by a probability between zero and one. For
example, based on sample observations and a calculated sample mean, a statistician can be 95% sure
that the true mean value for the population is within the estimated 95% confidence interval range. The
classical article that introduced this now-omnipresent statistical concept is J. Neyman, Outline of a
Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical Theory of Probability, 236 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON SERIES A 333 (1937).
117
See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
116
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incorporating the pronouncements that follow. At the onset, there is one
area in which post-treaty pronouncements must be treated equivalently with
originating treaties: both pronouncements and the treaties giving rise to
them may not violate the Constitution.118 However, post-treaty
pronouncements should not be treated exactly like treaties themselves,
because they do not undergo the constitutional procedural requirements for
treaties.119 As a consequence, incorporating post-treaty pronouncements
requires interpreting documents—the treaty and the Constitution—and then
fitting the pronouncement into the structure of federal law if it passes those
interpretive inquiries. A proper constitutional test for post-treaty
pronouncements must address both tasks in order to provide a sufficiently
comprehensive approach.
1.

Threshold Inquiry: Does the Pronouncement Violate a
Constitutional Provision?—The threshold interpretation test
involves a twofold constitutional inquiry. First, courts must examine
whether the pronouncement—not just the treaty that originated it—violates
some provision of the Constitution.120 Like the original treaty itself, no
post-treaty pronouncement should be incorporated if doing so would
violate parts of the Constitution. A specific pronouncement could be
entirely valid within the procedures prescribed by its originating treaty—
and its originating treaty may be constitutional—yet the pronouncement
itself could theoretically fail a constitutionality test.121 This first inquiry
precludes the incorporation of such a pronouncement.

118

Hathaway et al., supra note 1, at 266 (“Constitutional text and doctrine pose a set of affirmative
constitutional commands that necessarily limit the exercise of power by the federal government. Such
affirmative guarantees are set forth explicitly in the Bill of Rights’ recognition and guarantee of
individual rights and in the Constitution’s provisions prescribing the structure of the national
government.”); Leonie W. Huang, Note, Which Treaties Reign Supreme? The Dormant Supremacy
Clause Effect of Implemented Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2211, 2226 (2011)
(“Today it is well settled that all treaties are subject to the Constitution.” (citing Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1957))).
119
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
120
Cf., e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 (finding unconstitutional a treaty, not a post-treaty
pronouncement, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
429–30, 435 (1920) (noting that a treaty would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly infringed on
states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment, but finding the treaty in question constitutional because no
such violation was present).
121
Hypothetically, for example, the U.N. Economic and Social Council, whose areas of concern
include environmental protection, could recommend to the General Assembly a resolution that purports
to grant protected status to an endangered species which exists in the United States as a wholly
intrastate, noncommercial species. Under current commerce clause doctrine, such a resolution would be
unconstitutional if adopted by the U.S. Senate because it reaches purely intrastate commerce, Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824), and bears no substantial relation to interstate commerce, United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). If the federal government’s imposition of this restriction would
violate states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X, and exceed its
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2.

Procedural
and
Substantive
Compliance
with
the
Originating Treaty.—Second, courts should examine whether the
post-treaty pronouncement is valid under the treaty itself. This inquiry
involves determining whether the pronouncement meets procedural
requirements of the treaty122 and aligns with the substantive law governing
the pronouncement. Both procedural adequacy and substantive adequacy
are, in effect, reasonableness tests. In order to determine if a
pronouncement is reasonable within the scope of its originating treaty,
courts must look both to the text of the treaties that a pronouncement
claims to interpret and to the relevant existing elaboration—case law,
resolutions, “legislative history,” and so on—that may bear on the
procedural and substantive elements of the treaty. Even if a post-treaty
pronouncement is constitutional on its own, it cannot be incorporated into
U.S. law if it nonetheless substantively or procedurally violates the treaty
that gave rise to it in the first place.
The analysis is thus similar to courts’ assessment of whether an
agency’s regulation is a valid interpretation of a federal statute,123 or
whether an act of Congress is properly based in one of Congress’s
constitutional powers.124 In reviewing whether regulations are valid
interpretations, courts assess whether the statute is one that the agency
“administers”125 and whether the statute is ambiguous or silent on the point
to which the regulation refers.126 If both those prerequisites are met, courts
assess whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute,
own enumerated powers, id. art. I, § 8, a foreign body to which the United States is party via a treaty
likely cannot pass such a resolution.
122
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 11, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (defining the
crimes that may be litigated at the International Criminal Court and the temporal jurisdiction of the
court); RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 34–36, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17, U.N.
Sales No. E.08.I.9 (2007) (describing the voting rules for resolutions at the U.N. General Assembly).
123
E.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
124
E.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (addressing whether the Affordable Care Act is a valid
exercise of Congress’s powers under the Taxing and Spending, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper
Clauses).
125
Whether an agency “administers” a statute turns on whether the agency has exclusive authority
to enforce it or whether it shares that authority with other agencies. For example, in Rapaport v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit held
that the Office of Thrift Supervision did not deserve Chevron deference because it shared authority to
administer the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–
73 § 401(a), 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), with two other
agencies. Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 216–17 (“[W]e owe no such deference to the OTS’s interpretation of
§ 1818 because that agency shares responsibility for the administration of the statute with at least three
other agencies. The alternative would lay the groundwork for a regulatory regime in which either the
same statute is interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach
the courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all.” (internal citations omitted)).
126
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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and if so, courts accord agency interpretations maximal deference.127
Likewise, in reviewing whether statutes are valid exercises of constitutional
congressional power, courts look to whether one or more grants of power to
Congress authorize the specific statute in question. If an act of Congress
does not derive from one of those grants, the statute is unconstitutional.128
The analytical process courts would have to undergo to assess the validity
of post-treaty pronouncements, therefore, is hardly novel in comparison to
their typical domestic law work.
Admittedly, treaty interpretation may be a somewhat complex inquiry,
since courts must interpret substantive and procedural law from non-U.S.
jurisdictions. However, two points regarding courts’ existing tasks make
courts’ interpretive analyses for treaties less worrisome. First, courts
already interpret law from other jurisdictions, including the various
states,129 and occasionally even the laws of other countries and international
organizations.130 It is true that the interpretation this test requires of courts
may be more extensive than the analytical depth of treaties most U.S.
courts are used to. However, courts already conduct similar analyses on
domestic legal documents such as regulations and the Constitution.131 Thus,
even if courts were conducting more extensive inquiries into international
law documents than before, it is sufficiently similar to other interpretive
tasks they typically do in the domestic arena. Courts have the tools for
analyzing international organizations’ law and can build up this expertise
over time. Second, international bodies issuing post-treaty pronouncements
tend to have structures, procedures, and outcomes familiar to federal courts.
For example, the U.N. General Assembly and the WTO’s main body both
operate similarly to U.S. federal and state legislatures.132 Likewise,
127

Id. at 844.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
129
For example, courts consider whether state laws are procedural or substantive in conducting
analyses under the Erie doctrine, and as a result may apply state rather than federal substantive law. See
generally RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1013–110 (6th ed. 2013) (discussing choice of law in
diversity suits at federal courts and the Erie doctrine).
130
For example, where courts are asked to dismiss cases to foreign courts under the forum non
conveniens doctrine, they may occasionally consider whether the law of a foreign jurisdiction is
sufficient to promote the interests of justice, the parties, and the courts themselves. See, e.g., Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1981) (noting that inadequacy of legal remedies in a
foreign jurisdiction would justify not removing a case to it under the forum non conveniens doctrine,
but finding adequate legal remedies available to the plaintiff-respondent in the alternative forum).
131
See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
132
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 34–36, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17, U.N.
Sales No. E.08.I.9 (2007) (describing voting rules for U.N. General Assembly resolutions); DSB, Rules
of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council, at 11,
WTO Doc. WT/L/161 (July 25, 1996) (describing voting rules in the WTO General Council).
128
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international courts use common law reasoning similar to that used by U.S.
courts.133 Finally, international organizations that perform legislative or
judicial functions amass helpful guidance U.S. courts may use to aid their
interpretive tasks: legislative histories, case law, and so forth. Thus, the
threshold interpretation inquiry is more manageable than it may appear at
first.
3.

The Issue of Precedence for Constitutional Post-Treaty
Pronouncements.—If a post-treaty pronouncement survives the
two-step constitutional inquiry above, this Note argues that it should be
incorporated into federal law, but not at a level equivalent to the treaty as
the supreme law of the land. Rather, it should be incorporated with the
same level of precedence as a federal substantive (i.e., not procedural)
statute.134 This argument parallels Professor Bradley’s claim that treaties
themselves should be on parity with federal statutes.135 While Professor
Bradley’s argument as applied to treaties themselves is specious based on
the very text of the Constitution,136 applying his proposed level of
precedence to post-treaty pronouncements creates a desirable balance
between the interests of the international treaty regime and the
constitutional interests of the national government and of state
governments. Incorporating the post-treaty pronouncement fulfills the
purposes of the treaty, because not doing so is effectively equivalent to
refusing to follow a procedurally and substantively valid extrapolation of
the original treaty.
Moreover, incorporating the pronouncement at the specific level of a
federal statute matches constitutional logic based on the nature of federal
statutes and of post-treaty pronouncements. Post-treaty pronouncements
may take the form of rules, akin to legislative statutes,137 or adjudications,
akin to court cases.138 Rule-type pronouncements are functionally
analogous to federal statutes implementing non-self-executing treaties—
voluntary or otherwise—because they interpret the meaning of the treaty’s
provisions and surrounding laws.139 Federal statutes likewise draw on the
133

See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 249,
280 (2013) (noting examples of cases in which international courts have used common law reasoning).
134
Recall that the interpretation inquiry already requires the post-treaty pronouncement not to
violate any provision of the Constitution. See supra Section III.B.1.
135
Bradley, supra note 81, at 456.
136
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
137
E.g., supra note 8.
138
E.g., supra note 9.
139
E.g., S.C. Res. 678, pmbl. (Nov. 29, 1990) (noting that the U.N. Security Council was acting
pursuant to Article VII of the U.N. Charter in authorizing, through this resolution, collective military
action against Iraq at the beginning of the Persian Gulf War); Case Concerning Avena and Other
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authority allocated to Congress through its enumerated powers in the
Constitution.140 It is therefore constitutionally logical to apply the same
level of precedence to treaty-interpreting rules as is applied against
Constitution-interpreting federal statutes.141
Adjudication-type pronouncements pose a more complicated
conundrum, but one that is nonetheless best resolved by granting the same
level of precedence as is proposed for rule-type pronouncements. They are
analogous to case law interpreting the Constitution; they interpret treaties,
which are also “the supreme Law of the Land,” in specific factual
scenarios, but they are not the “treaties” themselves.142 Likewise, Supreme
Court constitutional case law precludes contrary statutes, but is not “the
Constitution” itself. In a similar way to constitutional case law, then,
adjudication-type pronouncements interpreting a treaty ought to take lower
precedence than the treaty (or the Constitution). However, the Supreme
Court has held that constitutional case law supersedes statutory
interpretation of the Constitution, suggesting that, at least in constitutional
law matters, case law has higher precedence than federal statutes.143 These
opposing approaches suggest alternatively that pronouncements based on
treaties should receive treaty-level or below-treaty-level (i.e., federal statute
level) precedence.
There is reason to resolve this conflicted position for adjudication-type
pronouncements by granting them federal statutory precedence, lower than
constitutional case law. Although the Constitution and treaties are both the
supreme law of the land, the Constitution takes precedence over treaties.144
Thus, generally speaking, interpretations of treaties should take lower
constitutional precedence than interpretations of the Constitution.
Moreover, adjudication-type pronouncements pose a much greater antidemocratic danger than constitutional case law, because they are frequently
enacted by agents not beholden to the people of the United States through
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 63 (Mar. 31) (interpreting Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention, supra note 73).
140
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
141
Functional analogousness of statutes and rule-type pronouncements aside, one may counter that,
unlike members of Congress, who are held accountable to the people of the United States by electoral
processes, the persons in charge of making post-treaty pronouncements are not held accountable to the
people of the United States by any analogous mechanism. See supra Section I.C. However, this concern
bears more directly on substantive and procedural limitations on the treaty-making power, which is
beyond the scope of this Note. As acknowledged at the introduction to this Section, this Note presumes
that the originating treaty itself and all bodies and mechanisms created directly under its provisions are
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U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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either appointment or election.145 The balance struck here best reconciles
concerns raised in the preceding paragraph.
A second reason that federal statute precedence is appropriate for ruleor adjudication-type post-treaty pronouncements is that the Constitution
places the foreign affairs power in the federal government and not in the
states.146 Post-treaty pronouncements, which interpret treaties entered into
under the foreign affairs power, should take higher precedence over state
laws in the legal hierarchy. In light of (1) the foreign affairs nature of
treaties, (2) concerns over both the higher position of the Constitution over
treaties and, (3) the nature of post-treaty pronouncements as not being
equivalent to the treaty itself, the best precedential position is that of
federal statutes.
Finally, while granting pronouncements a status equivalent to federal
statutes rightly establishes a presumption that they preempt state law,147
states still have room to challenge them on the grounds that they interfere
impermissibly with states’ constitutional rights.148 Where treaties are
ambiguous as to their specific obligations or are open to further
interpretation
through
post-treaty
pronouncements,
post-treaty
pronouncements will likely elaborate on the meaning of the treaty long
after the treaty was first entered into. In light of that reality, post-treaty
pronouncements will likely be more common and more important sources
of domestic obligations under the treaty than the originating treaties
themselves. Allowing states to challenge the validity of pronouncements
will become ever more essential to maintaining the proper balance of
power between states, the federal government, and international
145

See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
The Constitution affirmatively grants the treaty-making power to the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and grants power to Congress to make laws as
are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It also explicitly bars states from “enter[ing]
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” thus removing the treaty power for states, and by
negation, placing it in the federal government. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 preempted a state law); Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (holding that federal immigration law preempted a state law); Ridgway v.
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517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act could not allow tribes to
bring states before federal court, because doing so violated state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
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organizations. In light of Supreme Court case law authorizing states to
challenge federal statutes where they infringe on states’ constitutionally
protected powers,149 treating valid pronouncements as akin to federal
statutes best satisfies the constitutional balance between states and the
federal government.
As with voluntary treaties, courts need to grapple with a more
complex constitutional framework when addressing and incorporating posttreaty pronouncements. The threshold interpretation inquiry is complicated,
but analogous to reasonableness inquiries into statutes, regulations, and
common law rules that courts typically undertake. While there are certainly
potential issues regarding whether the proposed analysis is prudent or
possible, this Note has shown that any such problems can be resolved with
reference to other types of domestic law cases courts ordinarily take. The
issue of what precedence post-treaty pronouncements would take, if valid,
adds a layer of controversy. This Note provides a solution based on the
structure and internal logic of the Constitution that best resolves competing
international, federal, and state interests.
CONCLUSION
To stay relevant, constitutional theories regarding treaty making and
treaty execution must engage with changes in the international treaty
regime. This Note identifies two evolutions—voluntary treaties and posttreaty pronouncements—that neither case law nor academic research to
date has adequately addressed. Both evolutions involve an intricate balance
of interests between the international community, the federal government,
and the state governments. Because both voluntary treaties and post-treaty
pronouncements are likely to grow ever more frequent and complicated in
the future, scholars and judges alike must reconcile those complexities with
the logic of federal law and the Constitution.
The constitutional tests proposed are rooted in policy concerns as well
as in the text, structure, and logic of the Constitution. Voluntary treaties
raise the issue of what constitutes valid interpretation given their
ambiguous obligations. It is therefore prudent to begin with a presumption
that such treaties are non-self-executing, and then require implementing
statutes to surpass a twofold reasonableness inquiry based on the treaty
itself as well as U.S. interests in entering into it. And because post-treaty
pronouncements are made in pursuance of a treaty, but are not the treaty
itself, this Note begins with an interpretive reasonableness inquiry in light
of the Constitution and the treaty organization’s body of law. This Note
149

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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then incorporates a pronouncement that survives that threshold inquiry at
the level of federal substantive law.
Because treaties raise unique concerns unlike those that arise when
interpreting statutes, regulations, or the Constitution, this Note proposes
multistep reasonableness tests in order to allay concerns that a simpler
rational basis test would be too lenient.150 Using an approach that applies
constitutional principles in light of the special needs and circumstances that
emerge from voluntary treaties and post-treaty pronouncements, this Note
provides a vital methodology to navigate an increasingly complicated
international, legal, and constitutional order.
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347, 392 (2001).
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